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Attacks from Within:
Zimbabwe’s Assault on Basic Freedoms through Legislation
by Jamal Jafari*

Background
President Mugabe has ruled Zimbabwe since it gained independence in 1980. After maneuvering to head the largest
army that fought against white minority rule, he came to power
espousing reconciliation with the white population that had previously ruled Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was formerly known.
Mugabe initially attempted to establish a de jure one-party state
with his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) as the sole legal political party. He did not
succeed, however, and created a de facto one-party state instead.
During the formative stages of Mugabe’s rule, the administration did not tolerate dissent. In the early 1980s Mugabe
sent the North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwe
National Army to the Matabeleland region of the country,
where it killed 20,000 people. Matabeleland, a base for many
critics of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, was home of the Ndebele people who were united behind Joshua Nkomo and his Zimbabwe African People’s Union party (ZAPU), which opposed
Mugabe’s centralization of power. Nkomo eventually agreed
to a power-sharing agreement in which he would serve as
vice president as long as he merged his party with ZANU-PF,
thus eliminating the only major opposition party. This massacre, known in Zimbabwe as the Gukuruhundi, or “the rains
that cleanse,” set the tone for Mugabe’s response to future
attempts at political opposition.
From the late 1980s until the late 1990s, small political parties emerged, such as the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM),
to contest an occasional parliamentary seat or run a symbolic
presidential candidate who had no real chance of unseating
Mugabe. Even though these parties posed no practical risk to
Mugabe due to limited exposure and support, he did not hesitate to resort to violence and intimidation to ensure that no
opposition party gained a foothold in Zimbabwean politics.
For example, a ZANU-PF television ad broadcast during the
1990 presidential race threatened constituents who did not
wish to support ZANU-PF. The announcer of the ad, which
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ersonal freedoms in Zimbabwe have disintegrated over
the past few years as President Robert Mugabe has compromised the civil and political rights of citizens to
maintain his grip on power. In the face of mounting opposition to his rule, Mugabe has severely restricted the rights of
journalists to express themselves freely, the rights of opposition political parties to hold rallies and meetings, and the
rights of citizens to assemble freely. These rights are protected
under the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as well as international
covenants to which Zimbabwe is a party. These restrictions
have been codified in two news laws—the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) of 2002 and the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA) of 2002. Both laws were
instituted prior to a contentious presidential race in March
2002 and have allowed Mugabe to solidify his hold on power
by subrogating any opposition while claiming to uphold the
rule of law. This effort, which assured him an electoral victory
despite failing to meet international election standards, will
have far-reaching consequences on the rights of Zimbabweans to assemble, speak, and conduct a free press for years
to come. In addition, Zimbabwe’s problems come at a time
when the rest of the continent is moving toward democracy
and transparency. The failures of Zimbabwe will reflect poorly
upon pan-African efforts to achieve these goals.

Robert G. Mugabe, President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, addressing
the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002.

featured a car crash, stated: “This is one way to die. Another
way is to vote for ZUM. Don’t commit suicide. Vote ZANUPF and live.”
Mugabe’s hold on power began to crumble in September
1999, when the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) was born out of the labor movement. The MDC
demonstrated its strength in February 2000 when it mobilized
an effective campaign to defeat a referendum on a draft
constitution written by ZANU-PF that would greatly expand
the powers of the president. This was the first defeat ZANUPF ever suffered at the polls. Four months later, the MDC
emerged from a bloody parliamentary election campaign to
win almost 50 percent of the elected seats. In the process,
ZANU-PF members killed hundreds of people and tortured
thousands, the vast majority of them MDC members.
The presidential election was due to be held in less than two
years. ZANU-PF’s efforts to use violence and intimidation failed
to defeat the MDC. In subsequent court challenges, the MDC
nullified the elections of several ZANU-PF members of Parliament after the Zimbabwe High Court ruled that ZANU-PF’s
heavy-handed campaign tactics created an illegal advantage
for the ruling party. Although many judges who ruled against
ZANU-PF were forced to resign, opposition support continued
to grow. It was clear that the traditional tactic of violent suppression of opposition would not be enough to ensure Mugabe’s
re-election. To enhance its candidate’s chances of winning the
presidency, ZANU-PF resorted to instituting new laws in order
to limit dissent, free expression, and free assembly.

The Public Order and Security Act of 2002
POSA, which was passed in January 2002, replaced the Law
and Order Maintenance Act of 1960 (LOMA), one of the few
pieces of legislation retained from the Rhodesian era. LOMA
generally outlined police powers, state security measures,
continued on next page
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and the limits of personal freedom as they related to state security. LOMA was considered to be a draconian piece of legislation that served the interests of the white minority. Ironically, the Rhodesian regime often invoked this statute to
inhibit the revolutionary forces and their supporters who
now rule Zimbabwe. Mugabe kept LOMA in place after independence mainly due to its effectiveness in suppressing dissent against the government. The decision to replace LOMA
came after years of public criticism over its colonial roots and
the Mugabe regime’s desire to restrict opposition to the government beyond the boundaries of LOMA.

per Daily News, Mr. Mathe commented on reports that police
and members of the armed forces were beating civilians in the
area after the murder of an Australian tourist. He likened the
events to the Matabeleland massacres in the 1980s. The
police interpreted his statement as “causing disaffection
amongst members of the Police Force or Defense Forces,”
arrested him, and released him on bail pending trial.

Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on
Freedom of Assembly

Section 5 of POSA addresses acts of subversion. The language of section 5 is so broad, however, that even peaceful
protests may be subject to prosecution. Specifically, subsection
2(iii) of this act makes “coercing or attempting to coerce the
Government” a crime punishable by up to 20 years of imprisonment. “Coercing” is defined as “constraining, compelling
Effects of the Public Order and Security Act on
or restraining” through “boycott, civil disobedience or resisFreedom of Expression
tance to any law, whether such resistance is active or passive
Although LOMA was generally considered restrictive,
. . . if accompanied by physical force or violence or threat of
POSA has maintained, and in some instances expanded, limphysical force or violence.” Thus, any participant in a rally or
itations on personal freedom, including freedom of expresa mass stayaway may be subject to prosecution under this
sion. POSA retains the provision of LOMA that criminalized
clause. This would include any participant in a rally that is later
insulting the president, although the passage of POSA reduced
attacked by a government-sponsored militia, which occurs
the penalty from five years of imprisonment to one. Section
with some regularity.
16 of POSA criminalizes the making of virtually any negative
Section 17 of POSA, which addresses public violence, has
comment about the president in his professional or personal
been expanded to apply to anyone
capacity. This section also crimiwho “forcibly disturbs the peace,
nalizes any printed or broadcast
security or order of the public . . .
“abusive, indecent, obscene or false
Any organizer of a public gathering who
or invades the rights of other peostatement” directed toward the presfails to seek approval from the state may
ple.” On the surface, the objective
ident. Although there is no indeof this provision seems to preserve
pendent electronic media within
be fined up to $10,000 Zimbabwe dollars
the peace by punishing rioters. A
Zimbabwe, virtually any writer at
(U.S.$179) and imprisoned for up to
closer examination reveals that it
an independent newspaper could
can be applied to anyone who
six months according to section 24(6).
be arrested for criticizing the presobjects to the operations of the
ident. In practice, however, the govstate. For example, Raymond
ernment has chosen to prosecute
Majongwe, secretary-general of the Progressive Teacher’s
journalists under AIPPA rather than rely on this provision.
Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ), was twice arrested under secAn additional provision of POSA that inhibits the right of
tion 17 while leading a nonviolent national teacher’s strike
free expression is section 15, which prohibits making any false
in October 2002. Each time, he was arrested for approaching
statements prejudicial to the government, or any oral or
teachers at schools and encouraging them to join the strike.
written false statements that may, inter alia, adversely affect
During the first arrest he was badly beaten in police custody
Zimbabwean defense or economic interests, or undermine
and prevented from seeking medical attention for days. Durpublic confidence in defense and law enforcement agening the second arrest he was tortured by having electrodes
cies. The determination of what constitutes a “false stateapplied to his genitals and his mouth. The police told him to
ment” is left up to the executive. This provision not only
call off the strike and not to talk to the press.
affects any local or foreign journalist writing about ZimIn general, POSA strengthens the police force and equips
babwe, but also severely hinders human rights groups and
it with broader powers to inhibit demonstrations. Section 25,
other advocacy organizations that serve as a check on the govwhich regulates public gatherings, has enabled police to
ernment. If the press and non-governmental organizations are
approve, disapprove, or shut down virtually any public gathstripped of their power to criticize the state, critical debate
ering at will. Any person who wishes to hold a public gatherin Zimbabwe will come to a virtual halt.
ing must provide advance notice to the authorities, who then
Another new clause incorporated into POSA is section 12,
have the power to determine the duration, location, and
which addresses causing disaffection among the police forces.
route of the gathering. The authorities may deny any request
Under this clause, any person who commits an act that may
for a public gathering if they claim it will cause public disorbe construed as attempting to cause the police or defense
der, a breach of the peace, or an obstruction to any thorforces to withhold their loyalty, services, or allegiance, or to
oughfare. Any organizer of a public gathering who fails to seek
commit a breach of discipline, may be fined 20,000 Zimapproval from the state may be fined up to $10,000 Zimbabwe dollars (U.S.$357) and imprisoned for up to two years.
babwe dollars (U.S.$179) and imprisoned for up to six months
Because most police stations have close ties to governmentaccording to section 24(6). In addition, section 27 gives the
sponsored militias and often apply the law selectively, many
police the power to prohibit any gathering within a specific
opposition supporters who report acts of political violence to
police district for up to three months. Section 28 provides that
the police are told that the police cannot help MDC members.
the organizer of any public gathering who has breached any
According to section 12, any person who makes public stateaspect of POSA relating to such gatherings may be held civilly
ments condemning the actions of the police or suggesting that
liable for damage that results from the gathering. Further, secthey should uphold the rule of law may be a target for prostion 31 states that any person at a public gathering who
ecution. For example, MDC official Kenneth Mathe was
“engages in disorderly or riotous conduct; or uses threatenarrested and brought before a magistrate in the resort town
of Victoria Falls on January 24, 2003 for violating section
continued on next page
12(a) of POSA. In an interview with the opposition newspa-
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ing, abusive or insulting words; or behaves in a threatening,
abusive or insulting manner” may be liable for a fine up to
$50,000 Zimbabwe dollars (U.S.$893) and may be imprisoned for up to two years. Police have even required advance
notice of political discussions taking place at public places in
the capital city of Harare.
Officials have relied on POSA when arresting elected
MDC officials. On January 11, 2003, Harare Mayor Elias
Mudzuri, his deputy mayor, and several members of the city
council were arrested and charged with addressing an illegal
gathering under section 25(1) of POSA, which regulates
public gatherings that may cause “public disorder; or a breach
of the peace; or an obstruction of any thoroughfare.” According to the British Broadcasting Corporation, at the time of
their arrest, the officials were holding a meeting with residents
at the city council building and were discussing municipal
issues such as water, sewage, and roads.
Because POSA was passed two months before the presidential election, the restrictions on public gatherings had a
serious effect on the campaign for the presidency. President
Mugabe addressed roughly 50 rallies during that period and
all ZANU-PF rallies were allowed to proceed unhindered. In
contrast, Morgan Tsvangirai, the head of the MDC and its candidate for president, managed to hold only eight rallies. The
MDC secured a court order to prevent the police from interfering in a rally in February 2002, but cancelled the rally
after police refused to provide security in the face of mounting threats. In all, the police used POSA to disrupt or prevent
83 MDC rallies between January and March 2002. They often
prevented MDC meetings in private homes as well, and disrupted a meeting between Mr. Tsvangirai and diplomats
held at a hotel. The police disrupted several gatherings of the
Zimbabwe Election Support Network, an organization devoted
to voter education and free and fair elections, after classifying the gathering as political and therefore subject to the provisions of POSA.

The Access to Information and Protection of
Privacy Act of 2002
The Zimbabwean Constitution has never explicitly guaranteed freedom of the press, although it does guarantee free
expression to all citizens in section 20, which has been interpreted to include journalists. Before AIPPA was passed in
March 2002, journalists were prevented from publishing information that contained state secrets or could be proven to be
defamatory. There was no law hindering the ability of journalists
to operate, except for a statute regulating electronic media.

Accreditation of Journalists and Mass Media Outlets
AIPPA has drastically changed the work of journalists in
Zimbabwe. Among other measures, it has created a Media and
Information Commission (Commission) to oversee the press,
has imposed a strict registration policy on journalists, and has
introduced severe penalties for publishing false information. Three members of the Commission are chosen by officials from journalist organizations and three by associations
of media owners, while the remaining members are chosen
by the minister of information under orders from the president. The minister has the power to accept or reject any
members nominated by journalists and media owners and
holds the final decision, along with the president, as to who
sits on the Commission.
The Commission has the power to register any individual
journalists and all mass media outlets, including newspapers, magazines, news services, and any organization that
derives revenue from news collection and dissemination.
8
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Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), at a press conference in Harare, criticizing
the ZANU-PF-led government for physically abusing
members of his party during a mass stayaway opposing
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe’s human rights
record and dictatorship.

Sections 65 through 77 of AIPPA specify who may be a mass
media owner, the manner in which he or she must apply for
registration, and the manner in which he or she must operate in order to retain registration with the Commission. Section 65 provides that all mass media owners must at least be
citizens of Zimbabwe. In addition, all partial owners must be
permanent residents of Zimbabwe. Under section 69, the
Commission may refuse to register any organization that violates the Act and may suspend or nullify registration due to
bankruptcy of any owner or membership in a banned organization pursuant to section 71.
In a country where there is little internal capital investment,
section 71 severely hampers the ability of news organizations
to raise money. In addition, the mandatory registration of journalists amounts to the requirement of approval from the
government to practice as a journalist. In practice, local journalists are initially granted registration, but renewal by the
Commission is delayed or halted for those who have been particularly critical of the government. A journalist cannot report
freely on government activities if he or she is worried about
the nullification of his or her registration.
Journalists are subject to individual registration according
to sections 78 through 90 of AIPPA. Under section 79, all journalists must apply to the Commission for registration that must
be renewed annually. Only Zimbabwean citizens and permanent residents are eligible to receive this type of accreditation. Section 79(4) stipulates that any foreign reporter may
be accredited for a maximum of 30 days. Therefore, all
reporters from outside the country must get prior approval
from the government and inform it of the subject of their
work. A foreign media outlet may set up a permanent office
in Zimbabwe, but only with prior approval from the Commission according to section 90.
As a result of the passage of section 79, numerous foreign
journalists have been denied entry into Zimbabwe after their
requests for temporary accreditation were denied. Among
those denied visas were Sally Sara of the Australian Broadcontinued on next page
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every citizen has the “freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart ideas and information without interference, and
freedom from interference with his correspondence.” There
casting Corporation and David Blair of the British Daily Teleare exceptions to this right. In Section 20(2)(a), exceptions
graph who was immediately deported upon arrival. Further,
are made in the interest of “defence, public safety, public
the government alleges that it accredited 580 journalists
order, the economic interests of the State, public morality or
before the March 2002 presidential election, but a private
public health.” AIPPA goes one step further, however, and
media watchdog group, the Media Institute of Southern
restricts freedom of expression on the basis of accuracy of
Africa, suggests that number is closer to 72.
information as perceived by the state. This is clearly a limiLocal reporters have been most affected by the registration
tation the Constitution did not intend, and is currently being
policy. For example, Fanuel Jongwe, a senior reporter for the
debated by the courts.
Daily News, was arrested on January 27, 2003 in the town of
In addition, the provisions of AIPPA outlined above vioZvishavane along with five foreigners and charged under
late Zimbabwe’s obligations under international law. Article
section 79 of AIPPA, which prohibits practicing journalism
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
without a license from the Commission. The five foreigners,
(ICCPR), to which Zimbabwe is a state party, guarantees
reported to be members of the World Lutheran Foundation
freedom of expression, including
(WLF), were charged under sec“freedom to seek, receive and
tion 72, which prohibits running a
impart information and ideas of all
media outlet without authorization.
In April 2002, Geoff Nyarota, the editor-inkinds, regardless of frontiers,
Jongwe stated that he had been
chief of the Daily News, was arrested
either orally, in writing or in print,
invited to cover the WLF’s activiin the form of art, or through any
ties as a development organization
under section 80 after publishing a story
other media of his choice.” The
in the area. The group was later
accusing the Registrar General of Elections
only restrictions that may be
released after police confiscated a
imposed are those that are prolaptop, notebooks, cameras, and litof releasing contradictory information to
vided for by law and aim to protect
erature.
different media outlets concerning the
the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order,
results of the presidential election.
Effects of the Access to Information
public health, or morals. Any
and Protection of Privacy Act on
restriction must be justified as
Freedom of Expression
“necessary” for achieving one of these purposes. General
Possibly more troubling to journalists than the accreditaComment 10, which elaborates on the implementation of Artition issue are the new restrictions on freedom of expression
cle 19, is clear that a state party may impose restrictions on
imposed by AIPPA. Section 64, entitled “Abuse of Freedom of
the right to freedom of expression only if such restrictions do
Expression,” criminalizes usage of mass media outlets to comnot jeopardize the right itself.
mit a criminal offense or publish a false record. Anyone who
AIPPA’s requirement that journalists provide accurate
violates this section may be fined up to $100,000 Zimbabwe
information
is in violation of Zimbabwe’s international obligdollars (U.S.$1786) and may be sentenced to up to two years
ations. Although most international bodies recognize some
in jail. While many countries hold journalists civilly liable for
restrictions on press freedom to protect national security, AIPdefamation, criminal liability serves to stifle the free expresPA’s prohibition against publishing false information regardsion of information due to the threat of imprisonment.
less of content surpasses acceptable international norms. By
Individual journalists are also criminally liable from pubmaking journalists criminally liable for their reports, AIPPA
lishing false information under section 80, which provides
has trampled on internationally recognized components of
penalties if a journalist “falsifies or fabricates information, puba free press by imposing illegitimate restrictions on journallishes falsehoods . . . or contravenes any of the provisions” of
ists’ right to freedom of expression. Further, the restrictions
AIPPA. The definition of a falsehood is left up to the Comon the press not only inhibit journalists’ right to impart
mission and the minister of information. The penalties for vioinformation, but they also jeopardize the public’s right to
lating this section are up to a $100,000 Zimbabwe dollars
receive information. Unless AIPPA is amended, a truly free
(U.S.$1786) fine and up to two years in jail.
word may never again be published in Zimbabwe, in turn stiThese sections of AIPPA have been used repeatedly to
fling public debate among Zimbabweans.
detain journalists who publish stories that criticize the govZimbabwe also has obligations as a state party to the
ernment. In April 2002, Geoff Nyarota, the editor-in-chief of
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR).
the Daily News, was arrested under section 80 after publishArticle 9 states that “every individual shall have the right to
ing a story accusing the Registrar General of Elections of
receive information,” and “every person shall have the right
releasing contradictory information to different media outto express and disseminate his opinions within the law.”
lets concerning the results of the presidential election. In his
AIPPA certainly violates this provision by withholding regissubsequent legal challenge, Nyarota was remanded to prison
tration from some independent journalists and prosecuting
until early 2003 while the government considers whether
others for publishing allegedly false information. Imposing
section 80 of the AIPPA violates section 20 of the Constitusuch limitations violates the Constitution, making its legal
tion, which guarantees freedom of expression. In total, at least
application dubious. In addition, AIPPA contradicts the spirit
16 journalists were arrested and charged under section 80
of Article 9 of the ACHPR.
from the time of the presidential election until early July 2002.
AIPPA also contradicts nearly every provision of the Windhoek Declaration (Declaration) (1991) governing freedom
Zimbabwe’s Responsibilities under the Zimbabwean
of the press in Africa. Zimbabwe signed this document, which
Constitution and International Law
was drafted during the General Conference of United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1989 and
AIPPA’s Compliance with the Constitution and
later passed by the UN General Assembly. The Declaration
International Law
establishes that a free press is essential to a functioning
AIPPA has sparked fierce constitutional debate within
democracy and every effort should be taken to remove govZimbabwe. Section 20 of the Constitution maintains that
continued on next page
Zimbabwe, continued from previous page
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ernment restrictions on the press, establish constitutional
guarantees of press freedom, and protect journalists fromprohibitions on their freedom of expression. Specifically, the
Declaration states that “African States should be encouraged
to provide constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press . . . .” Additionally, the Declaration asserts that “African
Governments that have jailed journalists for their professional activities should free them immediately.”
These documents represent the will of Africa and the will
of the world in allowing free speech. By preventing free
access to information through the restrictions in AIPPA,
Zimbabwe is turning its back on regional and international
standards to which it previously agreed to adhere. Throughout its current crisis, Zimbabwe has repeatedly said that
African problems demand African solutions, but this argument
holds little weight considering the disrespect Mugabe has
shown to standards of free speech outlined by the ACHPR.

POSA’s Compliance with the Constitution and
International Law
Zimbabwe has contravened sections of its own Constitution
and provisions of international law by passing and implementing POSA. Section 21 of the Constitution guarantees the
right to assembly and does not provide for the sweeping
authority POSA gives to officers of the state to restrict such
gatherings. Further, Section 20 provides for freedom of
expression and makes exceptions only for the protection of
national security, defamation, and other circumstances relating to the general public welfare. POSA’s restrictions on
freedom of assembly, including breaking up private meetings
and outlawing all public assembly in certain areas for up to
three months certainly contradict the Constitution, even if
state security is considered. The assembly itself should always
be guaranteed even if the content of the discussions at certain gatherings may be regulated, in extreme circumstances,
in the interests of security.
POSA also contradicts many provisions of the ICCPR. Article 21 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly and only
provides for exceptions for situations “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Preventing peaceful demonstrations as stipulated under POSA cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society. These
internationally recognized provisions, if implemented, would
allow Zimbabweans of all political persuasions to assemble
peacefully. As POSA is written, this is not possible.
Article 11 of the ACHPR states that every individual shall
have the right of free assembly provided he abides by the law.
As provisions of POSA itself may be unconstitutional, certain
provisions may violate Article 11 regarding to peaceful assembly. These provisions represent the will of Africa to protect
peaceful assembly. POSA’s restrictions on assembly and criticism of the president contradict the will of Zimbabwe’s
neighbors and the previous will of Zimbabwe itself.

Conclusion
POSA and AIPPA represent an assault on the freedoms of
the Zimbabwean people guaranteed to them under the
ICCPR, the ACHPR, and their own Constitution. A careful
examination of both acts reveals that they were designed in
part to aid the government during the presidential election
and were used afterward to silence opposition voices and
journalists in the independent media. Unchallenged, they create a virtual police state in which the government can deny
10

any public assembly (even gatherings in private homes),
prosecute any person for a perceived threat or insult to the
government, prevent journalists from expressing themselves,
and prosecute journalists who disseminate information contrary to the official version of events. While sections of these
acts are being challenged in court, they represent a trend by
Mugabe and the government of Zimbabwe to put self-preservation before the rights of the people.
These pieces of legislation are symptomatic of the larger
problem of Mugabe’s autocracy and disregard for the needs
of the Zimbabwean people. At age 79 and a hardened veteran
of many physical and political battles, it is unlikely that he will
have a change of heart and loosen his grip on basic freedoms.
As internal dissent is suppressed, the key to the reinstatement
of these rights lies within the international community, starting with Zimbabwe’s neighbors. As Zimbabwe dwindles deeper
in its political and economic problems it relies more on
international organizations such as the Commonwealth, an
organization composed mainly of Britain and its former
colonies, and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC). To date, SADC has offered mild criticism, and the
Commonwealth renewed its suspension of Zimbabwe for a second year due to gross neglect of human rights. Despite
mounting criticism, African powers such as South Africa and
Nigeria have shielded Zimbabwe from further action by the
Commonwealth while SADC has taken little significant action.
South African President Thabo Mbeki recently suffered a
setback to his “quiet diplomacy” efforts with the Mugabe
regime. Days after using POSA to arrest MDC Vice President Gibson Sibanda for his involvement in leading successful mass stayaways protesting the government, Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa announced that neither POSA nor
AIPPA would be amended in any way because the government
is “under siege” from the MDC. The government had considered the idea of amending POSA and AIPPA as a way of
easing sanctions and gaining favor among international bodies, but eventually abandoned this plan.
The test of Africa’s future begins with Zimbabwe. If the
ideals of the African Charter are going to be realized, ushering
in an era of democracy and peaceful transfer of power
through free and fair elections, Zimbabwe must be used as
a model. African leaders must join the international call for
“smart” sanctions targeted at Zimbabwe’s leadership, not its
suffering population. The Commonwealth and SADC should
strip Zimbabwe of any power within their organizations until
a legitimate election has been held. Most importantly, all
nations should condemn the restriction of basic rights and
the establishment of an autocracy where a democracy once
existed. If all nations, especially African nations, condemn
Mugabe’s tactics, he might be convinced to leave office and
hand over power to a more moderate government. Only
then can Zimbabweans hope to enjoy the rights guaranteed
to them by their Constitution and the laws of humanity. 
*Jamal Jafari is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

